{"id":266,"date":"2017-06-02T14:19:49","date_gmt":"2017-06-02T14:19:49","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/securitycurve.com\/?p=266"},"modified":"2017-06-02T14:19:49","modified_gmt":"2017-06-02T14:19:49","slug":"told-you-so-but-pacemakers-maybe-not-the-worst-of-it","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/securitycurve.com\/?p=266","title":{"rendered":"Told you so. But pacemakers maybe not the worst of it"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a>In the continuing saga of why the lack of security in biomed will eventually start killing people, we have yesterday the results of a security\u00a0analysis<\/a>\u00a0of a pacemaker where they found apparently 8600 flaws<\/a>\u00a0— of which some are potentially deadly. \u00a0It’s an interesting report. \u00a0I urge you to read it.<\/p>\n

Now,\u00a0WhiteScope is of course in the business of doing firmware research and assessments — so it’s arguably good for them from a marketing standpoint if the results are panic-inducing\u00a0— but if you read it for yourself, I think you’ll conclude it’s fair and unbiased. \u00a0Yes, there are some specific points that are debatable — for example, they call out lack of encryption in the home monitoring device as an issue, which is absolutely fair. \u00a0But that’s nuanced because architecturally it’d be hard to enable that (for telemetry at least) without also having the implantable device do it too, which in turn makes it complicated from a power (and therefore battery utilization) standpoint.<\/p>\n

TLDR? \u00a0Pacemakers could be attacked, and ultimately kill somebody under the right circumstances. \u00a0Read the report.<\/p>\n

I’ve been saying this\u00a0for years. \u00a0I’m not going to say I told you so (because I’m too mature for that) so instead, I’ll let Sheldon Cooper do it for me:
\n